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Abstract
Standard estimations of Taylor.s (1993) monetary policy rule assume
that the natural real rate of interest can be regarded as constant. By
contrast, based on Mankiew (2000) theory of Savers and Spenders, we
argue that the natural rate is related to the distribution of income between
the two types of agents. We show evidence from the U.S., based on a re-
speci￿cation of the Taylor rule proposed by Clarida et. al. (2000), that
the natural rate of is positively in￿ uenced by the long-run movements of
the labour share in the national income. As the labour share has been
falling since 1980s, our results indicate that the natural real interest rate
fell from around 6% to around 2% in the beginnings of our decade.
Estima￿ıes da regra proposta por Taylor (1993) assumem que a taxa de
juro real natural pode ser considerada como constante. N￿s defendemos,
baseando-nos na teoria de "Savers" e "Spenders" de Mankiew (2000) que a
taxa de juro natural estÆ relacionada com a distribui￿ªo de rendimento en-
tre os dois tipos de agentes. Mostramos evidŒncia para os Estados Unidos,
baseada numa re-especi￿ca￿ªo da regra de pol￿tica monetÆria proposta por
Clarida et. al. (2000), que a taxa de juro natural Ø positivamente in￿ uŒn-
ciada por movimentos de longo-prazo na "labour share" no rendimento
nacional. Como a "labour share" tem vindo a cair desde os anos 80, os
nossos resultados indicam que a taxa de juro natural nos Estados Unidos
caiu, de 6% nos anos 80, para perto de 2% no in￿cio da nossa dØcada.
AMPEC: `rea 3 JEL: E43, E52
Keywords: Natural rate of interest, labour share, monetary policy
(Taxa de juro natural, labour share, politica monetaria)
11 Introduction
Conventional wisdom holds that the joint forces of productivity and thrift de-
termine a unique level of the interest rate consistent with full employment and
a constant rate of in￿ ation ￿the so-called equilibrium or ·natural· rate of in-
terest1. In this spirit, Taylor￿ s 1993 monetary policy rule suggested that - when
both in￿ ation and output are at their target levels - central banks should set the
real rate of interest equal to the equilibrium or natural rate. Taylor assumed this
natural rate to be constant ￿and his assumption has since become a standard
practice in econometric estimations of the Taylor rule [for notable examples, see
Taylor (1999) and Clarida et. al. (2000)].
However, there is no a priori reason to see the natural rate of interest as
an inherently constant value. ·[The natural rate] is essentially variable. If the
prospects of the employment of capital become more promising, demand will
increase and will at ￿rst exceed supply; interest rates will then rise and stimulate
further saving at the same time as the demand from entrepreneurs contracts,
until a new equilibrium is reached at a higher rate of interest. And at the
same time equilibrium must ipso facto obtain ... in the market for goods and
services.· (Wicksell, 1935, p. 193)
In this paper, we investigate another reason why the natural rate of interest
may be variable. In line with the modern theory of consumption (see Mankiw,
2000), we start with the assumption that the long-run propensity to spend out
of wages is higher than the corresponding propensity to spend out of non-wage
income. In this setting, if the economy is initially at full employment and
there is (say) a permanent increase of the labour share in the national income,
aggregate demand will rise. As a result, the level of interest consistent with
1The concept can be traced back to Wicksell (1935, p. 193): ·The rate of interest at which
the demand for loan capital and the supply of [full-employment] savings exactly agree ... [is]
the natural real rate.· (italics in the original).
2full-employment and a constant in￿ ation rate will become higher. Hence, there
will be a positive association in the long run between the labour share and the
natural rate of interest.
In order to test this hypothesis, we estimate a policy rule which relaxes the
standard assumption of a constant natural rate of interest, and instead allows
for the idea that it may be related with the labour share in the national income.
The main result is that the natural rate of interest is positively and signi￿cantly
in￿ uenced by long run movements in the labour share in the national income.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses why should labour
share be a important determinant of natural rate of interest. Section 3 sets up
a policy rule speci￿cation which will allow us to test our hypothesis. In section
4 we present empirical evidence. Section 4 concludes.
2 Labour share on the natural rate of interest
Empirical evidence suggests that there are many households - belonging to the
working class - for which saving is not a normal activity. First, consider the
following comparison between income distribution and the wealth distribution.
According to the U. S. Census Bureau, the lowest two quintiles of the income
distribution earn about 15 percent of income. But the lowest two quintiles of
the wealth distribution own only 0.2 percent of household wealth.
A related fact is the low absolute level of wealth of many households (see,
Wol⁄, 1998). The mean net worth of the lowest two quintiles is only $900 and
￿if we exclude home equity ￿the mean falls to a negative $ 10,600, indicating
that credit-card and other debts exceed ￿nancial assets. Excluding home equity,
net worth ￿i.e., accumulated savings - is negative for 28.7% of households.
Second, empirical evidence suggests that those households who do not save
belong to the working class. For example, Shea (1995) examined microeconomic
3data and concluded that an increase in wages resulting from union contracts of
1 percent leads to an increase of consumption of 0.89 percent.
While many households have almost no wealth, a few much. According to the
U.S. Census Bureau, the top 5 percent of the income distribution has typically
earned 15-20 percent of all income. By contrast, the top 5 percent of the wealth
distribution owns 60 percent of the household wealth, a number that rises to
72% if we exclude home equity. This suggests that some households are ￿net
savers￿￿they save not only to smooth their life-time consumption but also to
leave bequests to their descendants. Kottiof and Summers (1981) estimate that
70 percent of the accumulated wealth in the US is due to the bequest motive,
and not to life-cycle savings.
In short, the economy can be usefully divided into two types of consumers,
￿the savers￿and ￿the spenders￿(Mankiw, 2000). The savers are high-wealth
households who smooth consumption not only from year to year, but also from
generation to generation. The spenders are low-wealth working class households
who fail to smooth consumption over time, and instead live from paycheck to
paycheck, i.e., follow the simple rule of thumb of consuming their current income.
We can con￿dently assume that the labour and capital share are a good measure
of the distribution of income between the two consume types.
In this setting, we consider again the central question of the paper: what
might be the e⁄ect of a change in the labour share on the natural rate of interest?
The answer is as follows. If the economy is initially at full employment and there
is (say) an increase of the labour share in the national income, there will be a
shift of income from savers to spenders and therefore aggregate demand will rise.
As a result, the level of interest consistent with full-employment and a constant
in￿ ation rate will become higher. Hence, there will be a positive association in
the long run between the labour share and the natural rate of interest.
43 The Policy Reaction Function
To test our hypothesis we face a big problem ￿the natural rate of interest is
not observable. We have, therefore to ￿nd a indirect way to test it. We do it by
estimating an interest rate policy rule but allowing the natural rate of interest
to vary with the labour share. We use a re-speci￿cation of the monetary policy
function proposed by Clarida et. al (2000).
3.1 Clarida et al.￿s monetary policy rule
Clarida et. al (2000) start by postulating the following forward-looking version
of Taylor￿ s rule:
r￿
t = r￿ + ￿(E[￿t;kj￿t] ￿ ￿￿) + ￿E[xt;kj￿t] (1)
where r￿
t is the target for the nominal Federal Funds rate; ￿t;k is the per-
centage change in the price level between periods t and t+k; ￿￿ is the target for
in￿ ation; xt;k is a measure of the average output gap between period t and t+q;
E is the expectations operator and ￿t is the information set at the time the
interest rate is set; and r￿ is, by construction, the desired nominal rate when
both in￿ ation and output are at their target levels.
As is well known, in equation (1) ￿ and ￿ measure the desired interest
rate responses of the central bank to deviations of the expected in￿ ation and
output from their target levels, respectively. However, that equation is too
restrictive to describe actual changes in the Funds rate, because it assumes an
immediate adjustment of the actual Funds rate to its target level, and thus
ignores the Federal Reserve￿ s tendency to smooth changes in interest rates.
Therefore, Clarida et. al (2000) relax that assumption and specify the following
equation for the actual Funds rate, rt:
5rt = ￿rt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)r￿
t (2)
where r*t is the target Funds rate. Equation (2) says that in each period
the Federal Reserve adjusts the Funds rate to eliminate a fraction (1-￿) of the
gap between its current target level and last period interest rate; ￿ is thus an
indicator of the degree of smoothing of interest rate changes.
Combining the partial adjustment equation (2) with the target interest
rate equation (1) yields the following policy reaction function:
rt = (1 ￿ ￿)[rr￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)￿￿ + ￿￿t;k + ￿xt;k] + ￿rt￿1 + ￿t (3)
where ￿t = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)f￿(￿t;k ￿ E[￿t;kj￿t]) + ￿(xt;k ￿ E[xt;kj￿t])g and rr￿ =
r￿￿￿￿ is the natural real rate, assumed to be stationary and determined by non-
monetary factors in the long-run consistent with conventional wisdom. (Clarida
et. al., 2000, pp. 152-3).Equation (3) provides the basis for the indirect estima-
tion of the parameter vector of equations (1) and (2) - (Constant, ￿, ￿ and ￿),
where Constant = rr￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)￿￿2
3.2 A policy rule including a natural rate of interest de-
pendent on the labour share
In order to test our hypothesis, we relax the assumption of a constant natural
rate of interest (rr￿), and specify a monetary policy function that allows the
natural rate to depend on the labour share in national income. This policy
2From the estimated constant term, we can identify either rr￿(assuming a value for ￿￿) or
￿￿(by assuming a value for rr￿).
6reaction curve is express in the following way:
r￿
t = ￿ + ￿LSt + ￿￿ + ￿(E[￿t;kj￿t] ￿ ￿￿) + ￿E[xt;kj￿t] (1a)
where LSt is a moving average of the labour share, and (￿ + ￿LSt) is the
natural rate of interest, variable with changes in the labour share. Notice that
we won￿ t consider the labour share itself but a moving average. It is one way to
eliminate business cycles ￿ uctuations and better capture its long-run evolution.
Combining this new target interest rate equation (1A) with the partial ad-
justment equation (2) yields the following policy reaction function:
rt = (1 ￿ ￿)[￿ + ￿LSt ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)￿￿ + ￿￿t;k + ￿xt;k] + ￿rt￿1 + ￿t (3a)
which provides the basis for the estimation of the parameter vector (Constant,￿,￿,￿,￿),
where Constant = ￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)￿￿3
3Again, the identi￿cation of ￿ requires an assumption on the values of ￿￿.
74 Empirical evidence
In this section we report the estimates of the policy reaction function, with
and without the inclusion of the labour share as an explanatory variable. We
use two di⁄erent estimation methods suitable for the forward looking nature
of our reaction function: Generalized Method of Moments4 and (Non-Linear)
Two-Stage-Least Squares5.
We use quarterly data spanning the period 1979:3-2005:1, taken from the
FRED II database. We use as interest rate the quarterly average Federal Funds
rate (FEDFUNDS), expressed in annual rates. The baseline in￿ ation measure
is the rate of change of the GDP de￿ ator (GDPDEF) between a quarter and the
same quarter of the previous year. The baseline measure of the output gap is the
di⁄erence between the logarithmized series of the real potential GDP (GDPPOT
- U.S. Congress CBO) and of the real GDP (GDPC96). We calculated the
Labour Share as the ratio of the compensation of employees paid (COE) over
the national income (NICUR), although to capture the long run evolution by
using a 30 quarters moving average (variable shown in Figure 1), subtracted
by its mean6. Further ahead we test the robustness of our results considering
di⁄erent lengths for the labour share moving average.
The instrument set includes four lags of the output gap, the Fed Funds rate,
in￿ ation, and the spread between the 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
(GS10) and the Federal Funds rate. In the regression that included the Labour
4Since the residual term is a linear combination of forecast errors, it must be orthogonal
to any variable in the information set ￿t. Choosing a set of instruments zt so that zt ￿ ￿t,
it follows that, for both cases:
Ef[rt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(rr￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)￿￿ + ￿￿t;k + ￿xt;q) ￿ ￿rt￿1]ztg = 0 (4) which sum-
marizes the set of orthogonality conditions that must hold. Notice also that if the number
of instruments (dimension of zt) is greater than the number of parameters to be estimated,
some overidentifying conditions must be tested in order to validate both the speci￿cation and
the set of instruments used.
5In both cases the standard error where computed by employing the Newey-West covariance
matrix using 4 lags to adjust for potential autocorrelation.
6We do this in order not to in￿uence the analysis of the constant term. Subtracting the
mean of moving average of the labour share allows us to compare ￿ with rr￿:
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Figure 2 reports the estimates of the parameters of both interest rate rules (3
and 3a) ￿the constant, ￿, ￿, ￿ and ￿ - using the baseline variables for in￿ ation
and the output gap. The target horizon is assumed to be one quarter for both
in￿ ation and the output gap (i.e. k = q = 1 in equations 3 and 3A).
Constant b g r a
Without LS (3) -0.021 3.23 1.17 0.86 -
(p = 0.765) (0.009) (0.29) (0.232) (0.024) -
With LS (3a) 0.017 1.68 1.21 0.83 1.94
GMM
(p= 0.767) (0.005) (0.169) (0.187) (0.023) (0.577)
Without LS (3) 0.003 2.32 1.01 0.82 -
(0.008) (0.269) (0.287) (0.049) -
With LS (3a) 0.018 1.84 0.91 0.75 2.7
TSLS
(0.008) (0.229) (0.205) (0.054) (0.732)
Figure 2 : Baseline Estimates
9The coe¢ cient of the labour share is positive and highly signi￿cant: as
expected, a permanent increase in the labour share of national income leads to
an increase in the equilibrium interest rate. But the most interesting feature is
its magnitude. From both methods the estimated coe¢ cient is around 2, which
means that the decrease of 1.5 percentage points in the labour share moving
average, from 1983 until 2000 (see ￿gure 1), implied a change of the real natural
rate of around 3 to 4 percent. Considering that the natural interest rate is
usually treated as constant, this result gives some food for thought.
4.1.1 Estimated Natural Real Interest Rate
We now consider a series of exercises to construct the estimated series
of the natural real interest rate. It is clear that our estimate must track the
labour share moving average depicted in ￿gure 1, since it is its only determinant.
We must, nevertheless, make one assumption in order to identify ￿ - the ￿xed
component. We can see in ￿gure 3 our estimates under 4 di⁄erent assumptions.
In the ￿rst graph we assume that ￿ is simply the sample average of the real
interest rate (as we subtracted the labour share moving average mean) and
then add the labour share e⁄ect. In the other three graphs we identi￿ed ￿ by
using the estimated constant term and assuming a given value for the in￿ ation
target. We plot the results for an in￿ ation target of 1%, 2% and 3%.
As the only variable term is the labour share, the sample negative trend is
similar in all cases. The natural interest rate is above the sample average in the
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Considering: inflationtarget = 0.03
Figure 3 : Estimated Natural Rate of Interest under 4 assumptions
4.2 Robustness Analysis
We now investigate the robustness of our results along several dimensions. We
consider (1) alternative measures of in￿ ation and the output gap, (2) alternative
target horizons for each variable, (3) parameter stability across sub-samples, (4)
a backward-looking version of our monetary policy reaction function, and (5)
alternative lengths for the moving average of the labour share. As we will see,
the basic conclusion from the baseline case remains essentially intact.
114.2.1 Alternative Measures
We start by re-estimating the policy reaction function using di⁄erent measures
of in￿ ation (the rate of change of the consumer price index) and of the output
gap (the detrended log of output7). Figure 4 presents the estimates.
Constant b g r a
Detrended Output
Without LS (3) -0.051 4.22 4.03 0.93 -
(p = 0.702) (0.029) (1.066) (1.748) (0.027) -
With LS (3a) -0.028 3.42 3.77 0.92 2.72
GMM
(p= 0.700) (0.022) (0.853) (1.518) (0.031) (1.501)
Without LS (3) 0.001 2.01 2.2 0.84 -
(0.01) (0.277) (0.797) (0.05) -
With LS (3a) 0.014 1.63 1.79 0.79 2.17
TSLS
(0.009) (0.009) (0.597) (0.058) (0.84)
CPI  Inflation
Without LS (3) -0.037 3.09 1.13 0.91 -
(p = 0.736) (0.013) (0.407) (0.396) (0.019) -
With LS (3a) -0.011 2.28 0.97 0.88 2.04
GMM
(p= 0.759) (0.01) (0.29) (0.287) (0.026) (0.852)
Without LS (3) 0.002 1.81 0.84 0.87 -
(0.012) (0.322) (0.395) (0.04) -
With LS (3a) 0.022 1.32 0.73 0.78 3.59
TSLS
(0.010) (0.246) (0.246) (0.049) (0.793)
Figure 4 : Estimation Under Alternative Measures For Output and
In￿ ation
As can be seen, the key results from the baseline case are robust to the use
of alternative output gap and in￿ ation measures. In fact, the slope coe¢ cients
remain statistically signi￿cant and have similar magnitudes of those found in
the base line estimation.
7The log of output was detrended applying the HP-Filter.
124.2.2 Alternative Horizons
The baseline case assumes that the Federal Reserve reacts to changes in both
in￿ ation and the output gap looking one quarter ahead (i.e. k = 1 and q = 1 in
equations 3 and 3a). We now relax this assumption by analysing two alternative
target horizons: (i) one year for in￿ ation and one quarter for the output gap
(i.e. k = 4 and q = 1); and (ii) one year for in￿ ation and two quarters for the
output gap (i.e. k = 4 and q = 2). The rationale for this procedure is that
these horizons are more in line with the current consensus regarding the lag
with which monetary policy a⁄ects either variable (see, for example, Bernanke
and Mihov, 1998). The results are reported in Figure 5. As can be seen, the
estimated reaction functions are again very similar under these two alternative
target horizons, and very close to the baseline case.
Constant b g r a
k = 4, q = 1
Without LS (3) -0.032 3.71 1.1 0.86 -
(p = 0.788) (0.012) (0.43) (0.264) (0.029) -
With LS (3a) 0.02 1.52 1.19 0.85 2.2
GMM
(p= 0.828) (0.007) (0.225) (0.215) (0.024) (0.671)
Without LS (3) -0.012 2.91 0.98 0.85 -
(0.019) (0.726) (0.471) (0.041) -
With LS (3a) 0.016 1.9 0.91 0.78 2.84
TSLS
(0.01) (0.311) (0.23) (0.05) (0.832)
k = 4, q = 2
Without LS (3) -0.046 4.03 1.19 0.87 -
(p = 0.866) (0.015) (0.503) (0.35) (0.029) -
With LS (3a) 0.02 1.52 1.19 0.85 2.04
GMM
(p= 0.829) (0.007) (0.225) (0.214) (0.024) (0.852)
Without LS (3) -0.012 2.91 0.98 0.85 -
(0.019) (0.726) (0.471) (0.041) -
With LS (3a) 0.004 2.33 0.84 0.82 2.29
TSLS
(0.018) (0.679) (0.367) (0.046) (1.03)
Figure 5 : Alternative Horizons Estimates
134.2.3 Subsample Stability
We now ask whether the estimated parameters are stable along the full sample,
or instead di⁄er according to the Fed￿ s chairman. Thus, we split the sample into
the Volcker period (79:3 ￿87:2) and the Greenspan period (87:3 ￿05:1). We
also consider a third sub-sample (Post-82) that excludes the ￿rst three years of
the entire sample8. The results are reported in ￿gure 6.
Constant b g r a
Volcker
Without LS (3) -0.005 2.87 0.46 0.77 -
(p = 0.958) (0.013) (0.449) (0.19) (0.058) -
With LS (3a) 0.018 2.11 0.73 0.43 13.48
GMM
(p= 0.970) (0.003) (0.087) (0.086) (0.031) (0.946)
Without LS (3) 0.041 1.39 0.22 0.59 -
(0.011) (0.265) (0.237) (0.091) -
With LS (3a) 0.025 1.84 0.46 0.51 9.38
TSLS
(0.008) (0.209) (0.209) (0.067) (2.548)
Greenspan
Without LS (3) 0.013 1.85 1.46 0.82 -
(p = 0.923) (0.01 (0.351) (0.201) (0.037) -
With LS (3a) 0.01 1.89 1.52 0.8 1.35
GMM
(p= 0.883) (0.008) (0.31) (0.167) (0.027) (0.56)
Without LS (3) 0.008 2.01 1.41 0.81 -
(0.009) (0.342) (0.204) (0.042) -
With LS (3a) 0.026 1.21 1.43 0.82 3.1
TSLS
(0.011) (0.449) (0.179) (0.026) (1.33)
Post-82
Without LS (3) 0.008 2.32 1.25 0.89 -
(p = 0.860) (0.021) (0.871) (0.291) (0.033) -
With LS (3a) 0.044 0.95 1.37 0.88 4.43
GMM
(p= 0.917) (0.022) (0.791) (0.271) (0.032) (1.878)
Without LS (3) -0.015 3.01 1.32 0.89 -
(0.022) (0.966) (0.381) (0.043) -
With LS (3a) 0.018 1.75 1.14 0.83 2.95
TSLS
(0.013) (0.511) (0.232) (0.045) (1.207)
Figure 5 : Subsample Stability
8Two reasons justify this procedure: (i) this period was characterized by a sharp disin￿ation
policy, and (ii) during this period the Federal Reserve decided to target the nonborrowed
reserves rather than the Federal Funds rate.
14It is interesting to notice that the estimated coe¢ cient of the output gap is
much lower for the Volcker period than it is for the entire sample, re￿ ecting the
fact that in￿ ation rather than the output gap was the main goal of Volcker￿ s
policy. But notice, as well, that ￿ is much bigger in the Volcker period. This
might indicate that there was a big rise in the natural real rate in the 1980s
and that the very high interest rates in this period re￿ ected not only the ￿ght
against in￿ ation but also a higher natural rate. This analysis is consistent with
the estimated natural rate from the previous section.
4.2.4 Backward-Looking Estimates
All speci￿cations have so far assumed a forward-looking behaviour on the part
of the Central Bank. We now ask whether the results already obtained continue
to hold under the assumption of a backward-looking behaviour, in line with
Taylor (1993). Figure 7 presents the results for both k and q equal to -1. We
use the variables as their own instruments (as there is no endogeneity problem),
which means that the results of both estimations are numerically the same and
equal to the non-linear least squares estimates. As can be seen, the baseline
results are largely validated under this new hypothesis as well.
Constant b g r a
Without LS (3) -0.012 1.81 0.62 0.8 -
(0.009) (0.248) (0.256) (0.052) -
With LS (3a) 0.034 1.35 1.08 0.73 3.32
(0.01) (0.248) (0.320) (0.080) (1.341)
Figure 6 : Backward Looking Estimates
We can take one additional conclusion from all the analysis so far. It seems
that the coe¢ cients from the policy rule tend to su⁄er from an omitted variable
bias. Although the sign of the e⁄ect is not very clear for ￿;both ￿ and ￿ tends
15to persistently overestimated when labour share is not included. This suggests
that standard econometric studies of the Taylor rule have incorrectly estimated
the responses of the interest rate to changes in in￿ ation.
4.2.5 Alternative Lengths for the Moving Average of the Labour
Share
The baseline case assumes a moving-average length of 30 quarters for the labour
share. This might seem a bit arbitrary in the ￿rst place and therefore we com-
plete our robustness analysis by estimating the equation with di⁄erent moving
average lengths. The following graph plots the value of the labour share co-
e¢ cient in the right hand side scale and its p-value on the left hand side, for

















Figure 7 : Labour Share Coe¢ cient and
P-Value
The coe￿cient is only strongly and unambiguosly signi￿cant for lengths over
4 years and its very stable with values ranging from 1 to 4. This is well in
accordance with our hypothesis since, only structural shifts in income should
a⁄ect the natural rate and not short-run shifts due to business cycle dynamics.
16We used the estimations to calculate the implicit change in the natural real
interest rate since the 1980s till 2000, by multiplying the labour share by the
sample di⁄erence between maximum and minimum. We plot its value for the
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Figure 8: Implied Change in Natural
Interest Rate
If we consider a length of around 5 years (20 quarters) the implied change
in the natural interest rate is of around 9%, which intuitively seems very high.
If we use lengths of more than 24 quarters the implied change ranges, rather
steadily, between 2 to 5 percent. It is clear that the key results of our baseline
investigation still hold when we consider any moving averages lengths greater
than three years.
175 Conclusion
Standard estimations of the Taylor rule assume that the natural rate of interest
- the level of interest consistent with full-employment and a constant in￿ ation
rate - can be regarded as constant. By contrast, this paper presented evidence,
based on a re-speci￿cation of the Taylor rule proposed by Clarida et. al (2000),
that the natural rate is positively in￿ uenced by the long-run movements of
the labour share in the national income ￿a result which follows from the fact
that the propensity to spend out of wages is higher than the propensity to
spend out of non-wage income. The estimations show that the magnitude is
quite considerable and that since the 1980s the natural real interest rate fell by
around 3-4 percentage points.
Implications for monetary policy? Here is an example. In the last few years
the labour share in the US has been at its lowest levels for decades. This means,
according to our results, that, as labour share as been falling, the natural rate
may have also fallen to unusual low levels. Hence, the Fed￿ s record-low interest
rates (1-1.25% between November 2002 and July 2004) may have not been, after
all, too much below the natural rate - and the fact that in￿ ation did not rise in
those circunstances is therefore less surprising than is usually thought.
Our results also help to explain the in￿ ationary process in the 1980s. Figure
9 shows the labour share moving average and the real interest rates, extending
the sample period to start in 1960s. We can see that in the 1970s there was a big
increase in the labour share from around 0.62 to 0.66 and therefore the natural
interest rate must have increased. We believe that during this period there was
a misperception from the monetary authority regarding its increase. By keeping
real interest rate more or less constant, gradually became to low relative to the
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Figure 9
More generally, our results suggest that the labour share should be included
among the large set of information (behaviour of the money supply, movements
of the exchange rate, etc.) that central banks take into account in order to make
their interest rate decisions.
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